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This paper aims to figure out the impacts of capital tax policy on the economy where 
the government has a certain policy restriction; state-contingent capital tax rate. 
Simultaneously, households fully understand how the government behaves and make 
decisions based on the policy expectation. Under the framework used in this paper, I 
find that the state-contingent capital tax policy results in larger fluctuations of 
allocations as well as policies without notable differences in utility and capital 
accumulation compared to the economy under the state-independent capital tax policy.
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1. Introduction
 The aim of this paper is to investigate the following question. When society has a 
particular policy convention, state-contingent capital tax rate, how policy effects would 
be compared to the case in which the government implements the state-independent 
capital tax rate policy. To be concrete, in the economy under the state-contingent capital 
tax policy regime, the government announces next period's capital tax rate in advance, 
but this announcement is flexible and is able to be revised depending on the realized 
state of the economy; if the realized economic condition is adverse, the actual tax rate 
is decreased by specified percentage compared to the announced one. On the other 
hand, in the economy under the state-independent capital tax policy regime, the 
government can not modify its policy announcement and should implement the 
announced tax rate regardless of the state of the economy. The reasons that the 
government abides by the announced tax rate or modifies its policy announcement are 
not explicitly considered in this paper and just regarded as an inherent property of the 
economies. However, it can be interpreted as a kind of a policy restriction or a policy 
rule. Also, in both economies, households fully anticipate how the government acts and 
apply their expectation when they decide. 
 Clearly, policy effects would be significantly different if the government is under the 
different policy restrictions (regimes) and households fully know how the realized capital 
tax rate would be based on the announced capital tax rate. For instance, if the 
government fully recognizes that there may be a tax cut in the future, the announced 
capital tax rate may differ compared to the case that the government does not violate 
its policy plan. Also, if households anticipate that the policy announcement would not 
be revised, their saving decisions would be different. Moreover, since the capital tax cut 
leads to higher labor taxes in the economy without government bonds, this also 
engenders additional distortions in economic agent's decisions. 
 In this paper, I try to investigate impacts of different capital tax policy regimes on the 
economy. To address this problem, I use the dynamic Ramsey framework. However, 
there is a fundamental difference in my case that I include and apply certain policy 
restriction and household's expectation to the general Ramsey framework. 
 Although two situations described above are hypothetical cases, analogous examples are 
easily observable in the real world. Concretely, the periodically occurred tax cut during 
election times or changes in policy which is consistent with political agenda of the 
ruling party can be the extended examples of the situation this paper concerns. 
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 The motivation is quite similar to the 'Time-inconsistency' issue in macroeconomics. A 
lot of papers about time-inconsistency of policies focus on the setting that policies the 
government has set become no longer optimal with time, and thus the government has 
an incentive to re-optimize in spite of pre-determined policies. However, individuals who 
rationally anticipate government behaviors already make the decision based on their 
policy anticipation. Many papers concentrate on finding the equilibrium or examining 
policy effects under this circumstance. For example, Strotz (1955) studies inconsistency 
in dynamic utility maximization. He concludes that the optimal plan of the present 
moment will be violated generally, and the individuals' future behavior will be 
inconsistent with their optimal plan. Kydland and Prescott (1977) point out that the 
selection of decision which is best at certain situation does not result in the social 
objective function being maximized and there is no way control theory can be made 
applicable to economic planning when expectations are rational. Fischer (1980) 
investigates time-inconsistent policy using simple 2-period model and finds that 
consistency prevails in his framework if the government relies solely on non-distortional 
taxes to finance the public good. Tesfatsion (1986) establishes necessary and sufficient 
conditions for consistency for a general class of dynamic Walrasian economies. 
Recently, time-consistent policy is actively studied using the Markov-perfect equilibrium 
concept. Markov-perfect optimal taxation has been studied by several researchers such as 
Klein and Rios-Rull (2003) and Klein et al (2008). Klein at al (2008) examine how a 
benevolent government that cannot commit to future policy should trade off the costs 
and benefits of public expenditure. Klein and Rios-Rull (2003) study the properties of 
the optimal fiscal policy in a stochastic growth model when the government cannot 
commit itself beyond the next period's capital income tax rate and compared results 
with those under full commitment economy. At last, Debortoli and Nunes (2010) 
analyse an optimal fiscal policy problem where the plans made by the benevolent 
government are periodically revised. They devise a 'loose commitment' concept which 
corresponds to the periodically revising policy commitment due to the exogenous change 
such as replacing of ruling party. 'Time-(in)consistent fiscal policy' is an important topic 
which has been actively studied. However, while this kind of view regards policy 
deviation as an active policy re-optimization process1), I comprehend changes in the 
1) Generally, capital tax imposed on initial asset is lump-sum tax. Thus, benevolent government 
has an incentive to impose heavy capital tax in upcoming periods, if there is not commitment 
technology, even though it already levied a heavy capital tax on initial asset. A lot of papers 
concerning the time-inconsistent issue deal with this situation, which is obviously different 
with the topic of mine.
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policy discussed in this paper as a passive response to the policy restriction or a kind 
of the social convention. That is, the government sets subsequent announced capital tax 
rates at the initial period and this tax policy is committed. The only thing which is 
revised periodically is realized capital tax rate which follows the specific policy 
restriction. Also, while papers on the time-inconsistent policy consider changes in 
policies as a result from ability to alter the previous decision with time, I focus on 
policy changes caused by the state of the economy, not a decision timing. Thus, in the 
strict sense, the motivation of this paper is far different with a 'time-inconsistent policy' 
issue. 
 As the Ramsey framework assumes the full-commitment technology, the question of 
this paper is more close to the dynamic Ramsey problem with a certain policy 
restriction. The dynamic Ramsey problem has been studied by many researchers such as 
Lucas and Stockey (1983), Chamley (1986), Zhu (1992), Chari et al (1991, 1993, 1994, 
1995, 1999) and Stockman (2001). Lucas and Stokey (1983) are concerned with the 
structure and time-consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy 
without capital. Their main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich 
maturity structure, an optimal policy, if one exists, is time-consistent. Meanwhile, 
Chamley (1986) makes a elementary framework of dynamic Ramsey problem under the 
deterministic economy and concludes that if an equilibrium has an asymptotic steady 
state, the optimal policy is eventually to set the tax rate on capital to zero. Zhu (1992) 
and Chari et al Chari et al (1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1999) analyse the Ramsey 
problem under a stochastic economy. Chari et al (1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1999) 
conclude that labor income tax should be essentially constant over the business cycle, 
Ex-ante capital tax rates should be roughly zero in each period and the return on debt 
and the Ex-post tax on capital income should absorb most of the shocks of the 
government budget constraint. Especially, Chari et al consider a few special examples 
such as non-contingent capital taxes with state contingent return on bond (or inverse 
case) and exogenous tax policies2). Finally, Stockman (2001) solves the Ramsey problem 
under the balanced budget constraint. Using the Ramsey approach which assumes 
full-commitment technology, I include the aforementioned restriction on the capital tax 
policy as an additional constraint of the general Ramsey problem. Also, I try to apply 
household expectations to the general Ramsey framework, while the previous studies on 
the Ramsey problem assume households take government policies as given. 
2) They consider the economy which has a constant capital tax rate  =0.27 and a constant 
labor tax rate  =0.24. 
- 4 -
 In this paper, I focus on the comparative study of policy effects between different 
policy regimes ; One is the Markov-switching (MS) policy regime that the government 
announces the next period capital tax rate in previous period but is not obliged to keep 
that. In other words, it freely adjusts announced capital tax rate based on the realized 
economic condition. However, agents who already know the government tends to deviate 
from the previous policy announcement apply it to their decision. Another policy regime 
is the Fixed policy regime under which government abides by its policy announcement 
regardless of the realized state of the economy. When I solve this problem, the 
Markov-switching parameter term   which changes depending on the state of the 
economy plays an important role. To capture policy effects which result from   
using the first-order approximation, I opt for a Markov-Switching DSGE perturbation 
method developed by Foerster et al (2010, 2011, 2013).  
 This paper is laid out as follows. Section2 describes the models, solves the Ramsey 
problem under the particular policy restrictions and discusses about determining 
parameters and steady state values. After that, the MSDSGE perturbation method is 
briefly introduced and applied to the problem. Section 3 provides numerical results ; 
Interpretation of policy functions, impulse-response analysis and Monte-carlo simulation 
results. Lastly, section 4 concludes. In the Appendixes, impulse-response figures and 




 I postulate two different types of policy regimes.
① The MS policy3) regime :    
  i f   
  i f    
② The Fixed policy regime :   
  i f   
  i f  
where   is realized capital tax rate at period t,   is announced capital tax rate 
determined at period t-1 and  is the policy restriction parameter. In both economies, 
the government announces in period t-1 that the capital tax rate of the next period (t) 
3) MS means Markov-switching. The concrete meaning is described in the later section.
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would be  . While, in the Fixed policy case, the government keeps its policy 
announcement regardless of realized state of the economy, the government under the MS 
policy regime adjusts its policy announcement depending on the realized state of the 
economy. Simultaneously, households already know how the government would behave 
(decrease capital tax rate by a% if the state of the economy at the following period 
would be recession) and apply their expectation when they decide. 
 The model and framework used here are similar to those used in Chari et al (1991, 
1993, 1994, 1995, 1999) and D. Stockman (2001). The model is a standard neoclassical 
real business cycle model with an exogenous growth shock which follow the Markov 
process and a government spending shock which is independent from a growth shock. 
 I denote a history up to and including period t as    and each   is 
an element of a finite state space S. The initial realization   is given and there are a 
large number of identical infinitely lived agents. A constant returns to scale technology 
is available to transform labor  and capital  into output via 
 . Note that the production function incorporates an exogenous 
stochastic shock as defined in Chari et al (1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1999). The output 
is used for private consumption , exogenously specified government spending 
 and investment . Thus, the resource constraint is 
 
                    (1)
Households




subject to the household budget constraint
≤                           (2)
where    
 
for all , with initial capital stock  and 
 taken as given.  
   means a gross return on capital after taxes and depreciation and  and 
4) Throughout this paper, I assume that utility function satisfies the Inada condition.
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 are the before-tax returns on capital and labor. 
 The unique part of this paper is the existence of  term which can be interpreted 
as a social tax-cut convention or a policy restriction that government must follow as 
well as households believe it to be exactly realized. When the government implements 
the state-contingent capital tax policy,  is a varying parameter depending on the 
state of the economy 5). Conversely, when the government implements the 
state-independent capital tax rate,  is a fixed value,  , independent of the realized 
state . In this paper, I call the former case the MS (Markov-switching) policy regime 
and the latter one the Fixed policy regime. 





   (3) 

  
                                            (4)
where 
 and 
 denote the marginal utilities of consumption and leisure at 
state . 
Firms
 A representative firm maximizes profit6) by choice of  subject to 
 , where the production function  is constant returns to 
scale in capital and labor. The assumption of constant returns to scale and the perfect 




 .                (5)

 and 
 mean marginal products of capital and labor, respectively. 
Government
 The benevolent government takes an exogenous stream of expenditures  as 
5) Since   is a varying parameter depending on the realized economic state  , this is not a 
general type parameter, but a Markov-switching parameter. 
6)           -   where   means profit in period t.
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given and must satisfy its period-by-period budget constraint under the certain capital 
tax policy regime. The government's budget constraint is as follows. 
  
 for all        (6)  
where the government policies are   . 
2.2. The Ramsey Problem
 A Ramsey equilibrium is defined as a fiscal policy    , an allocation 
rule , and price rules  and  which satisfy following properties.
 Firstly, the policy T maximizes the agent's utility 

 subject to 
the government's budget constraint where the allocation and prices are given as , 
and .
 Secondly, the allocation  ′ maximizes 

   subject to the 
household's budget constraint evaluated at the policy  ′ and the prices  ′ and 
 ′ for every T'  
 Lastly, Prices satisfy  ′  ′ and  ′  ′ for every  ′.
 Because the dual approach which finds allocations and policies directly makes a 
problem too complex to solve under the dynamic framework, most dynamic Ramsey 
problem papers such as Chari et al (1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1999), Chamley (1986) 
and Stockman (2001) use the so-called primal approach. Although the typical primal 
approach has several advantages such as making the problem simple, it is sometimes 
difficult to use. For example, substituting all price and policy terms with allocation 
terms can be too burdensome under the certain case, or the problem which needs to 
consider additional constraints can be improper to use the primal approach. For a 
similar reason, the primal approach is no longer convenient when it comes to the 
problem of this paper because the additional policy constraint on the capital tax, 
state-contingent or state-independent capital tax policy regime, should be considered. 
Thus, I use the modified primal approach under which      and   are 
substituted with allocation terms, but   is left as a variable. 




① If {    } and {    } satisfy (2)∼(6), given initial 
conditions {} and  , then {
    } satisfy 
       
  

    
 
   
   

  








② Conversely, if {     } satisfy above constraints given initial 
conditions, then there exist     such that {      } 
and     satisfy resource constraint, government budget constraint, 
household's first-order conditions and firm's first-order conditions.
Proof ) See the Appendix A.
 Intuitively, the Ramsey equilibrium should be feasible and optimal under the social 
capital policy regime and the household's expectation. The proposition 1 states that the 
Ramsey equilibrium satisfy the resource constraint, the period-by-period budget constraint 
to which households and firms optimal conditions are applied and the Euler equation 
which makes the Ramsey equilibrium satisfy the policy restriction as well as a 
household's expectation.   
 We now have the Ramsey problem 




       
     

    
 
   
   7)  
7) When the government is able to issue debt freely, we can use the implementability constraint 
to greatly simplify the Ramsey problem. Without the ability to borrow and lend, it is not 
usable. Stockman (2001) solves the Ramsey problem under the budget balance restriction and 






     
            
  
  
   
      
     

  
    
  






given   , 
  and  .
 Let ,  and  be the Lagrange multipliers on the resource constraint, 
household budget constraint and Euler-equation, respectively.
 




   
   
    
            




       
      
   
 




         
          
   
    
   
       
   
            

   

      
   
          
   




         





        
  
        





         
    
    
       
for ≥. The first-order conditions at t=0 are slightly different due to the initial 
condition.  
 There are two important features. Firstly, unlike the typical dynamic Ramsey problem, 
the household's Euler equation is included as a constraint of the Ramsey problem to 
explicitly capture effects of the policy restriction on capital taxation. In most dynamic 
Ramsey problem papers, all price and policy terms disappear behind an implementability 
constraint and, after deriving optimal allocations, are just backed out using household 
and firm's first-order conditions. However, in this paper, it is more convenient to 
directly find period-by-period optimal announced capital tax rate since not only the 
substitution process is far more difficult, but the problem becomes too complex to solve 
the modified period-by-period budget constraint since I assume the economy without bond. 
8)           
   is a function of       and  . Also, 

  means the partial derivative of    with the variable   
- 10 -
if we stick to the general primal approach. 
 Secondly, as I already mentioned, what the government determines is the announced 
capital tax rate, not the realized one and the announced capital tax rate   is 
determined in the previous period t-19). If one interprets that   is an announced 
capital tax rate and  as a realized one, the meaning would be more clear. 
2.3. Numerical analysis
2.3.1. Parameter values
 Basically, I borrow parameter values and functional forms from Chari et al (1991, 
1993, 1994, 1995, 1999)10). The utility function and the production function are as 
follows.
Utility function :    ln ln   
Production function :      
   
  
   is a labor-augmenting technology shock and the technology shock has the law of 
motion   
 , where   follows a two state Markov process (Boom (Good) / 
Recession (Bad))11). The transition probabilities are      
   i f    i f ≠ . 
  which follows the same markov process with 
  is 0 when the state is a 
boom, and 0.04 in a recession 12) under the MS policy regime. Also, I consider the 
economy where   is fixed at zero, which means the Fixed policy regime. Finally, 
the law of motion for   is given as     where   is an I.I.D shock 
9) It is easily observable that 
    
  
    
     
 
         
        
 
 
10) To avoid the computational complexity related with detrending, I define shocks differently 
with Chari et al (1993). So, in principle, parameter values should be modified in accordance 
with the newly defined shock. However, since it is not a critical part of the research, I skip 
the calibration process and just borrow values from Chari et al (1993)  
11)      i f     i f   
12) In the MS policy case, the government do not change its policy announcement when the 
realized state is a boom, but decrease capital tax rate by 4% in a recession. On the contrary, 
the fixed policy case can be interpreted as if the government keeps its policy announcement 
regardless of the realized state of the economy. 
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Table 1








   i f    i f  
 /       i f    i f     /     
following N(0,). 
 The definition of the steady-state for models with Markov switching parameters is 
more complicated than that for standard DSGE models with constant parameters. To be 
consistent with the definition of the steady-state in standard DSGE models with constant 
parameters, the definition of the steady-state for MSDSGE model should be independent 
of the realization of the discrete Markov process. So I fix Markov switching parameters 
which influence steady state values (   ) on its ergodic means and derive steady 
states13). The specific parameter and steady state values are summarized in Table 1. I 
find one notable property of the steady state value; the steady-state value of   is , 
the ergodic mean of  . Since 
   is an actual (realized) capital tax rate, 
  means that the steady state value of the capital tax rate is zero. This finding 
corresponds to the Chamley (1986) and Chari et al (1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1999) 
results. 
13) Because the transition matrix is symmetric, the ergodic mean is just the arithmetic mean. 
Meanwhile, not all Markov switching parameters influence the steady state values. If we 
consider the economy that policy restriction takes this form ;  ×
 , then   doesn't 
affect steady state values since  =0 in this case. Whether the Markov switching parameter 





   1.4368
   1.0447
   0.3704
  0.2578
  /  0.02 / 0
Note : I assume that necessary initial values such as initial capital stock are the same with 
steady state values.
2.3.2. MSDSGE perturbation method
 Chari et al (1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1999) is often cited as an evidence showing that 
log-linearization is dangerous in the context of optimal tax policy problems14). Benigno 
and Woodford (2006) also point out a problem concerning the 'naive' linear-quadratic 
approximation of model in Chari et al (1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1999) and suggest 
'correct' linear-quadratic (LQ) approximation method.  
 As pointed out by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), the certainty equivalence of the 
first-order approximation is a main result of a constant parameter model. This implies 
that the first-order approximation of a constant parameter model is inadequate for 
analyzing behaviors of agents who response to uncertainty. Because I concentrate on the 
policy effects affected by Markov-switching parameters, the approximation methods such 
as log-linearization, 'typical' first-order perturbation method or LQ approximation are 
inappropriate approaches. To derive policy functions that are able to capture the effects 
which stem from the MS parameter, I adopt a MSDSGE perturbation method15). One 
powerful and interesting feature of the MSDSGE perturbation method is that this 
method can capture policy effects caused by Markov-switching parameters even with the 
first-order approximation. In this paper, I only briefly and intuitively introduce MSDSGE 
perturbation method. I recommend readers who want to know the detailed approximation 
process to read Foerster et al (2013).
 Here I present a rough example that illuminates the intuition behind this method. Let's 
14) Kim and Kim (2007)
15) Foerster et al (2010,2011,2013)
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assume a simple function   where  is a Markov-switching parameter. In 
the general approach, one pins   down at its ergodic mean, , and performs taylor 
(first-order) approximation. After that, one would get the below function.
 ≒    
 On the other hand, in the MSDSGE perturbation method, it assumes    
where  is a perturbation parameter which takes 0 in the (Long-run) steady state and 




    where the last term 
captures MS effects. 
 As noted above, one can derive several policy functions which correspond to the 
multiple states of the economy respectively and these functions capture 
Markov-switching effects even with the first-order approximation. In addition, by 
assuming the Markov-switching parameter in this way, one can also address the 
economy that the MS parameter value changes over time. The more detailed process is 
described in the Appendix B.
 
2.3.3. Deriving policy functions16)
 It is easily observable that control (non-predetermined) variables of the Ramsey 
problem in this paper are      , predetermined variables are 
     , an I.I.D exogenous shock is  , ∈  and 
Markov-switching parameters are    under the MS policy regime and   
under the fixed policy regime17). Since there are two states, 3 predetermined variables 
and 4 control variables, I have to solve the system of 42 quadratic equations18). After 
solving equations, I obtain 9 solutions19), but the only one satisfies the mean square 
16) Since some notations used below follow those presented in the Appendix, I recommend 
readers read that part first. 
17) Since the steady state value of   is the ergodic mean of  , all markov-switching 
parameters influence steady state values and, thus, is a function of the perturbation parameter 
 .
18) In each state, all variables should be expressed as a linear function of predetermined 
variables        . Therefore, we should solve 3×7×2 equations. Foerster et 
al (2013) suggest Mathematica which works well when solving the complex polynomial 
system and I use Matlab application program Mupad. 
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stability criterion. Policy functions under the MS policy regime are summarized in Table 
2. Also, I find policy functions where  is pinned down to zero, the Fixed policy 
regime, and record those in Table 3. 
 It is notable that slopes of policy functions of each regime in the same economic state  
are the same and the only differences across them are constant terms which capture the 
corresponding Markov-switching effects.  
  
Table 2

















19) See the Appendix C.
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Table 3


















 I carry out the impulse-response analysis and the MCMC simulation. In the impulse 
response analysis, I find the responses of the economies under the MS and Fixed policy 
regime to government spending shocks in each state. Each state (Boom / Recession) 
continues for 30 periods and government spending shock exists during period 5~10. 
Results help us to understand not only responses of policies or allocations to the 
government spending shock, but also differences between different policy regimes. In the 
MCMC simulation, I simulate 10000 periods without government spending shocks and 
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the first 1000 periods are discarded to reduce the effect of the initial transition.
3.1. The interpretation of policy functions
 By comparing policy functions, one can get a rough idea on differences between 
regimes. Since it is observable that slopes of policy functions are the same in both 
regimes, constant terms imply policy effects occurred by the difference in the policy 
regime. Ceteris paribus, economic agents under the MS policy regime consume more, 
supply labor more, save more and impose capital tax higher than the fixed policy case 
in a boom. In a recession, all trends are reversed. Furthermore, since absolute 
differences of constant term between policy functions are bigger under the MS policy 
regime, I guess that fluctuations of allocations and policies would be greater under the 
MS　policy regime. 
3.2. Impulse-Response analysis20)
 Investigating figures in the Appendix D, I find a few interesting characteristics. 
Especially, an increase in the government spending21) brings about a decrease in 
consumption, labor supply and capital tax rate, while an increase in labor tax rate. It is 
notable that capital tax rate decreases if there exists positive government spending 
shock. 
 The more interesting features are found through examining differences between the 
economy under the different policy regimes; The MS policy and the Fixed policy in 
each state. 
 At first, capital accumulation is almost similar in both cases. In both states, the MS 
capital tax policy regime does not bring about notable differences in the capital 
accumulation compared to the state-independent capital tax policy regime. 
 Secondly, it is observable that capital tax rates under the MS policy regime is 
relatively high in a boom compared to the fixed case. If the economic condition is  
bad, the government under the MS policy restriction has no choice but to impose lower 
capital tax rate. This makes the government announce higher tax rate to prepare against 
20) Figures are presented in appendixes
21) The government spending shock impact is more clear when the magnitude of shocks is 
larger. In fact, the capital tax rate shows explicit decreasing path during periods of shock 
when we increase the magnitude of shock.  
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Table 4
The comparisons of the economy under different regimes in each state
Boom Recession
Consumption MS > Fixed MS < Fixed
Labor MS > Fixed MS < Fixed
the possible future tax cut. Meanwhile, labor tax rate shows reversed results; labor tax 
rate is higher (lower) in the fixed policy case in a boom (recession). Since we assume 
the economy without government bonds, this result is reasonable. 
 Thirdly, households under the MS policy regime work more (less) in a boom 
(recession) than the Fixed one. One plausible interpretation of this result is as follows. 
Since the labor tax rate is lower (higher) in the MS case due to the high capital tax in 
a boom (recession), people have a disincentive to work and decrease their supply of 
labor.
 Lastly, one of the most interesting traits is found in the consumption. Consumption 
under the MS policy regime is higher in a boom and lower in a recession than the 
Fixed policy regime. Because the state-contingent capital tax policy is seen as an 
attempt to stabilize the economy against economic fluctuations, this is counter-intuitive 
at a glance. One may expect relatively low consumption with the high capital tax rate 
in a boom and high consumption with the low capital tax rate in a recession compared 
to the fixed policy case. I find the clue to this strange result by considering a 
secondary effect of the state-contingent capital tax policy. Since I consider the economy 
without government bonds, the decrease in the capital tax revenue should be replenished 
through the increase in the labor tax revenue. An increase in the labor tax rate 
influences not merely agent's labor supply decision but disposable income they can 
spend. The larger proportion of labor income in total income is or the higher labor tax 
rate is, the lower consumption people can enjoy.       
 The purpose of the state-contingent capital tax rate is generally considered to foster 
investment in the bad state and stabilize economy. However, I find contrary results; 
when the state-contingent capital tax rate is perfectly expected by households and 
implemented without government bonds, the state-contingent capital tax policy does not 
cause notable differences in the capital accumulation, but result in larger fluctuations in 
the economy. I summarize results in Table 4. 
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Capital MS ≒ Fixed
Capital tax rate MS > Fixed MS < Fixed
Labor tax rate MS < Fixed MS > Fixed
 
3.3. Simulation results
 I record Monte-Carlo simulation results in the table 5 and 6. First of all, I sort data 
by state of the economy and calculate elementary statistics, mean and standard deviation, 
of allocations and policies in each state. Results are presented in the Table 5.  
 As I already guessed in section 3.1 and 3.2, households averagely consume more, 
supply labor more, save more and the government levies higher capital tax rate and 
lower labor tax rate in a boom under the MS policy regime compared to the fixed 
policy one. Results are reversed in a recession. It is remarkable that households slightly 
save more (less) despite higher (lower) capital tax rate in a boom (recession) under the 
MS policy regime. As, in the real world, people tend to save less when they expect an 
increase in capital tax rate in the near future and save more in the contrary case, this 
finding accords with these actual tendencies.    
 In the table 6, I record simulation results from the whole data. It is interpretable as a 
long-run statistic. In the long run, differences between the MS policy and the Fixed 
policy disappear averagely. However, standard deviation of the economy under the MS 
policy regime is bigger than the fixed policy case because policies fluctuate more in the 
MS case and this leads to bigger fluctuations throughout the economy. People who 
rationally recognize the policy restriction respond actively by changing allocations a lot 
partly due to anticipation of policy revision and partly due to policy fluctuations. I also 
calculate life time utilities of each regime and find that utility under the fixed policy 
case is even 0.1% higher than the MS policy case22). That is, if agents rationally 
anticipate how the capital tax would be imposed and actively respond to that, effects of 
state-contingent capital tax policy are diminished. Specifically, if the government is not 










tax policy results in larger fluctuations in the economy over time without any increase 
of utility in the long run and policy attempts to stabilize the economy and stimulate 
investment would become almost ineffective. 
Table 5




MS Fixed MS Fixed
Consumption  0.2493 0.2489 0.0058 0.0057
Labor supply  0.2310  0.2307 0.0012 0.0013
Capital  1.4868  1.4862 0.0468 0.0469
Capital tax rate -0.0005 -0.0191 0.0560 0.0502
Labor tax rate  0.4971  0.4983 0.0048 0.0045
Recession
Mean Standard deviation
MS Fixed MS Fixed
Consumption 0.2292 0.2296 0.0059 0.0058
Labor supply 0.2216 0.2219 0.0012 0.0013
Capital 1.3862 1.3868 0.0474 0.0475
Capital tax rate -0.0003 0.0183 0.0558 0.0507
Labor tax rate 0.5137 0.5125 0.0052 0.0049
Table 6
Basic statistics on the economy under the different policy regimes
Mean Standard deviation
MS Fixed MS Fixed
Consumption  0.2391  0.2391 0.0116 0.0111
Labor supply  0.2263  0.2263 0.0049 0.0046
Capital  1.4355  1.4355 0.0685 0.0681
Capital tax rate -0.0009 -0.0006 0.0558 0.0538
Labor tax rate  0.5055  0.5055 0.0096 0.0084
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4. Conclusion
 In this paper, I investigate effects of the state-contingent capital tax policy compared to 
the state-independent capital tax policy using the dynamic Ramsey framework. To 
address this problem, I use the MSDSGE perturbation method that is able to capture the 
Markov-switching effects even with the first-order approximation. The main findings of 
this paper are as follows.
 In the economy without government bonds, 
- In the MS policy regime, the government announces higher capital tax rate than the 
economy under the fixed policy regime to prepare against the possible future tax cut. 
Furthermore, in the economy without government bonds, fluctuations in the capital tax 
rate result in the opposite trend of the labor tax rate which also significantly influences 
agent's decisions on allocations. 
- The fluctuation of allocations and policies would be greater under the MS policy 
regime than the fixed policy regime. To be concrete, households averagely consume 
more, supply labor more, save more and the government levies higher capital tax rate 
and lower labor tax rate in a boom under the MS policy regime compared to the fixed 
policy one. Results are reversed in a recession. It is notable that households invest less 
(more) despite lower (higher) announced capital tax rate because they know the 
announced capital tax rate would be adjusted depending on the realized state of the 
economy in the next period. 
- Contrary to the widespread belief that state-contingent capital tax policy would be 
helpful to stabilize the economy, the state-contingent capital tax policy in my framework 
only results in larger fluctuations of allocations and policies without any notable 
differences in the capital accumulation. Furthermore, the total utility is even higher 
under the fixed policy regime. This result implies that if the government cannot issue 
bonds freely or should keep balanced-budget, the state-contingent capital tax policy is by 
and large inefficient.  
 In this paper, I figure out effects of the state-contingent capital tax policy. While 
previous papers on 'Time-inconsistent policy' generally focus on finding out the 
inefficiency of the active re-optimization attempt by the government, I place major 
emphasis on examining ineffectiveness of the periodic policy revision depending on the 
state of the economy. Also, I try to apply household's policy expectations to the typical 
dynamic Ramsey problem unlike previous Ramsey problem studies that assume 
households just take policy as given. 
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 In a broad sense, this paper supports the famous argument 'Rules rather than 
discretion'. That is, the policy which adhere to the planned capital tax rate can be better 
than the policy that frequently revise announced capital tax rate. Furthermore, this paper 
implies that the tax policy should be independent not merely from the realized state of 
the economy, but also from the outside pressures such as public opinion or political 
incentives. Before finishing, it is worth to mention that considering results under the 
economy with government bonds would be an interesting further research topic.
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The proof of the proposition 1
① Add household budget constraint and government budget constraint to obtain 
   
   
    .
 Since we assume constant returns to scale technology, we are able to substitute 

   
   with     . Applying this to the above formula, 
resource constraint is obtained. 
 Using (3) to substitute for after-tax wage in the household budget constraint, we would 
get the quasi-implementability constraint23). 
 Households expect the capital tax rate based on the pre-announced capital tax rate. In 
addition, the benevolent government announces the next period capital tax rate in 
accordance with the household's optimal saving condition, Euler equation. Thus, It is 
trivial that household optimal decision and optimal capital tax policy should satisfy the 
Euler equation. 
 Initial condition follows from quasi-Implementability constraint evaluated at , using 
(3) and (5) at  as well. 
② Set    and    to satisfy (5). Choose   to satisfy (3). 
The initial condition gives us government budget constraint at t=0. Subtracting 
government budget constraint from resource constraint gives household budget constraint. 
□
23) I call this constraint quasi-implementability constraint because unlike typical implementability 





 I borrow notations, formulas and some nice explanations helpful for better 
understanding of this method from Foerster et al (2013). As, in this section, I only 
summarize and describe some essential parts which is necessary to understand the 
approach in this paper, the explanation of this part is imperfect and I strongly 
recommend readers interested in this method read Foerster et al (2013).
  Before initiating the detailed explanation, let's define notations first as follows
: (Exogenous and endogenous) predetermined variable
: non-predetermined(control) variable
: i.i.d exogenous shock with      
: Markov-switching parameters
: The number of predetermined variable24)
: (MS) perturbation parameter
  Given (    ), the equilibrium conditions for MSDSGE models have the 
general form 
                                     (7)
Step 1 : Partition the vector   of Markov-switching parameters into two sub-vectors. 
The first part contains the sub-vector of parameters that would influence the steady-state 
in the constant parameter case and thus is a function of the perturbation parameter . 
The second part contains the sub-vector of all remaining parameters that would not 
affect the steady-state in the constant parameter case. I denote the first sub-vector by 
 and the second sub-vector by  . Then we define      and 
 
  for all 25), where   is the ergodic mean across   and   is a 
deviation of   from   in state  .






   holds for all     and .
24)    and   means the number of each variables, respectively.
25) Any other functional form, so long as       holds for all  , will be valid.
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Let's model solutions take these form
        ,             and     .
 In general, we do not know the explicit form of g and h. Thus, we need to 
approximate them by Taylor expansions around the steady-state. In this paper, I only 
present first-order Taylor expansions, but this method can be easily expanded to higher 
orders. Our ultimate purpose is to obtain these approximated functions
                 and
               
, where    represents first partial derivatives of g with respect to    evaluated 
at the steady state for all  . Other terms are similar.
 Given the steady-state, I obtain       and    for all 
  and similarly at   .
Using these functions, the function f is written as 
       
                    
for all       and  . Then, (7) is written as
                   


        ′′  
Step 3 : Obtaining the derivatives of     and 
 I only describe the process obtaining the derivatives of    in here, but the basic 
principle to derive other derivatives is similar.











         
      
         
   
for all  . Taking       and the fact that   is an i.i.d shock into 
account, one can simplify the above expression to 
  








       
      
          











             
      
    




















                               (8)
where          ⋯   
and     


         for all 
 If we are able to solve   systems of quadratic equations (8), we obtain 
     for all . After this stage, deriving      and 
     for all  is just solving a linear equation, which is far more 
easy once we solve above equations.
 This quadratic system has, in general, many solutions. Each solution corresponds to a 
different first-order approximation. Finding all the solutions to this quadratic system is 
the toughest part but is crucial to ascertain how many of them imply stable 
approximations.
 Once we obtain      for all  , we should check stability of the 
solution. While we check whether the solution satisfies the Blanchard-Khan condition in 
the constant parameter case, we should consider other concepts of stability in the 
Markov-switching case. In Foerster et al (2010, 2011, 2013), they suggest mean square 
stability(MSS) criterion defined in Costa et al (2006). Specifically, the MSS requires 




where  P is the transition matrix, 

 is an 
 ×













 ⋯  ⊗ 
 If only one solution satisfies the MSS criterion, the model has a unique stable 
first-order approximation. If there is more than one solution that satisfies the MSS　
criterion, the model has multiple stable first-order approximations. If none of the 
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solutions satisfies the MSS criterion or if there is no solution of (8), the model doesn't 
have any stable first-order approximations.
 One of the powerful properties of the MSDSGE perturbation method is that the 
first-order approximation derived through this method is not necessarily certainty 
equivalent and capture Markov-switching effects. So, under some conditions, we are able 
to analyse economic agent's response to risk or uncertainty even with the first-order 
approximation. 
 After finishing the entire process, we finally obtain following linear functions.
   
  
 The last term which does not exist in the constant parameter model is the term that 
captures the Markov switching effect.  
 Generally, we fix the MS parameter to the certain value, treat it as a constant 
parameter and approximate the system. While this approach is convenient, one can only 
analyse average effects of MS parameter.  However, by assuming MS parameter as a 
function of the perturbation parameter , we can derive policy functions which capture 
Markov-switching effects. 
 The necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee non-certainty equivalent of 





  ≠   for 
some 26).
Proof ) See Foerster et al (2013)
26) At first, I set up the model that   is multiplied by  . That is, capital tax rate take 
this form ;  ×
 . If we define capital tax rates in this way, it doesn't satisfy the 
second condition. Specifically, since the  steady state value of   is zero, 
              is zero for all 
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Appendix C
MSDSGE perturbation method solutions
  The following table presents     and      only. Only solution 3 
satisfies MSS criterion.
Table 7
MSDSGE perturbation method solutions
















Figure 1 Impulse-response in a boom 
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Figure 2 Impulse-response in a recession
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국문초록




 본 논문은 정부가 경기 동조적인 자본세 정책을 시행하고, 가계는 이러한 정부
의 정책 시행 방식에 대한 인식하에서 실제 시행될 자본세율을 미리 예상하여 
이를 의사결정에 반영하는 경우, 해당 경제에서의 경기 동조적 정책의 효과는 어
떠할 것인지 동태적 최적 조세 문제의 방법론을 활용하여 살펴보고 있다. 구체적
으로, 정부는 현재기에 다음기의 자본세율을 미리 공표하지만 다음기의 경기상황
이 좋지 않은 경우 공표했던 자본세율을 그대로 시행하지 않고 특정 정도만큼 
자본세율을 낮춰주는 정책 제약 혹은 일종의 정책 관행을 갖는다. 한편, 가계는 
정부가 이와 같이 행동할 것임을 인식하고 있으며, 정부의 발표 세율을 바탕으로 
다음기의 실제 세율을 예상하고 이를 의사결정에 반영한다. 본 논문은 이러한 상
황 하에서의 정책 효과를, 정부가 실현되는 경기가 어떠한가에 관계없이 공표하
였던 자본세율을 그대로 시행하고 역시 마찬가지로 가계는 이와 같은 정부의 정
책 시행 방식에 대한 인식하에서 의사 결정을 내리는 경제의 경우와 비교 분석
함으로써 경기 동조적인 자본세 정책의 효과를 살펴보고 있다. 본 논문은, 정부
가 정부 채권을 발행하지 못하거나 균형 예산을 맞춰야 하는 등의 정책 제약 하
에 있는 경우, 본 논문의 모형과 방법론 하에서는 경기 동조적인 자본세 정책이 
일반의 예상과는 달리 효용증가나 투자 촉진 등의 효과 없이 단지 경제의 변동
성을 더 크게 만들 뿐이고, 이로 인해 정책의 당초 의도와는 달리 장기적으로는 
경제에 오히려 더 부정적인 영향을 야기할 수 있음을 보여주고 있다. 나아가, 본 
논문의 결론은, 경기 상황뿐만 아니라 정치적 유인, 사회적 여론 등으로 인한 주
기적인 자본 소득 감세정책이 경우에 따라서는 경제에 오히려 부정적인 결과를 
발생 시킬 수 있음을 보여주고 있다. 
주요어 : 동태적 램지 문제; 최적 조세; 마르코프-전환 매개변수
        경기 동조적 자본세 정책; MSDSGE Perturbation 근사 방법
학번 : 2012-20179
